

## Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9072

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 0128

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ENRG, OVIP, JA

SUBJ: REPORT ON MIKI VISIT

REF: STATE 001641

SUMMARY: EMBASSY SUMMARIZES FONOFF BRIEFING ON RESULTS OF MIKI MIDDLE EAST TOUR AND LOCAL PRESS COVERAGE OF VISIT. FONOFF, MIKI AND MASS MEDIA APPEAR TO CONSIDER TRIP SUCCESSFUL. MIKI IS EMPHASIZING RECOGNITION OF PRIME U.S. ROLE IN SEARCH FOR MIDEAST SOLUTION AND NEED FOR JAPAN TO SUPPORT THIS EFFORT. END SUMMARY.

1. POL/COUNS ASKED FONOFF MIDEAST BUREAU COUNSELOR NAKAMURA, WHO ACCOMPANIED DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER MIKI ON RECENT MIDEAST VISIT, TO REVIEW TRIP. DURING NEARLY TWO HOURS DISCOURSE, NAKAMURA MADE FOLLOWING POINTS OF INTEREST:

A. GOALS OF MIKI TRIP. MIKI REITERATED AT EACH STOP THAT HE WAS NOT ON A MISSION IN SEARCH OF OIL. RATHER, HE POR-TRAYED HIS TRIP AS ARISING FROM A CONVICTION THAT JAPAN MUST DO ALL IN ITS POWER TO HELP REALIZE PEACE IN THE MIDEAST AND TO DEEPEN ITS COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH ARAB COUNTRIES. OIL OF COURSE CAME UP, BUT MIKI MADE IT CLEAR TO ALL WITH WHOM HE TALKED THAT JAPAN REALIZED THAT THE OIL PROBLEM COULD NOT BE SOLVED UNTIL THE BASIC MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM WAS SOLVED. WHEN THE OIL QUESTION WAS RAISED, MIKI EMPHASIZED THE SERIOUS ECONOMIC EFFECTS THAT THE OIL SHORTAGE WAS HAVING NOT ONLY ON JAPAN BUT ALSO ON LDCS AND ASKED FOR A JOINT CONSUMER-CONFIDENTIAL

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PRODUCER APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM.

B. RECEPTION BY ARABS. NAKAMURA SAID THAT MIKI WAS WARMLY WELCOMED IN EACH COUNTRY, AND THE FACT MIKI PLAYED DOWN THE OIL ANGLE AND EMPHASIZED THAT HE CAME TO ASSIST THE SEARCH

FOR A PERMANENT POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDEAST, AND TO HELP BUILD STRONGER BILATERAL TIES WITH EACH COUNTRY, WAS ESPECIALLY WELL RECEIVED. LEADERS IN EACH COUNTRY SAID THAT THE ARABS HAD NO DESIRE TO HURT JAPAN OR THE EC, AND SADAT AND FAISAL SAID THAT THEY REGARDED JAPAN AS A FRIEND AND WOULD WORK TO PERSUADE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES TO TREAT JAPAN AS A FRIENDLY COUNTRY. NAKAMURA SAID THAT FACT THAT OPEC HAD SUBSEQUENTLY RELAXED OIL CUTBACK TO JAPAN WAS TAKEN BY GOJ AS EVIDENCE THAT SADAT AND FAISAL HAD INDEED DONE THIS.

C. QUESTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. ALL COUNTRIES WELCOMED JAPAN'S NOVEMBER 22 STATEMENT QTE TILTING UNQTE TOWARD ARABS, BUT NAKAMURA SAID THAT IT WAS NEVER DIRECTLY SUGGESTED TO MIKI THAT JAPAN SHOULD QTE RECONSIDER UNQTE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. KUWAIT CAME CLOSEST BY CALLING ON JAPAN TO GO BEYOND STATEMENTS AND TAKE SOME QTE POSITIVE ACTION UNQTE.

D. HOPES FOR SETTLEMENT. NAKAMURA REVIEWED EACH COUNTRY'S CONDITIONS FOR A MIDEAST SETTLEMENT AS CONVEYED TO MIKI DURING HIS VARIOUS VISITS. HE SAID THAT ALGERIA, EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA AND SYRIA WERE THE KEY COUNTRIES ON THE ARAB SIDE OF THE EQUATION, BUT THAT ALGERIA AND SAUDI ARABIA BELIEVED THAT THE DETAILS OF A SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE LEFT TO SYRIA AND EGYPT, DIRECT PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT. SAUDI ARABIA'S FEELING TOWARD THE MIDEAST PROBLEM WAS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES BECAUSE OF ITS POSITION AS THE RELIGIOUS CENTER OF ISLAM. KING FAISAL WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM, A CITY HE DESCRIBED AS MORE IMPORTANT TO CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS THAN IT WAS TO JEWS. NAKAMURA QUOTED PRINCE KAMAL AS SAYING TO MIKI THAT WHILE THE SAUDIS WANTED JERUSALEM TO BE AN ARAB CITY, IF OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AGREED TO ITS INTERNATIONALIZATION THE SAUDIS WOULD NOT OBJECT. IN REGARD TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, FAISAL SUGGESTED TO MIKI THAT AN INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATIC STATE MADE UP OF CHRISTIANS, JEWS AND MOSLEMS WHICH WOULD EITHER BE A PART OF JORDAN OR INDEPENDENT AS DECIDED BY THE NEW STATE ITSELF. THE SAUDIS TOLD MIKI THAT NEW BORDERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST COULD BE GUARANTEED EITHER BY THE UN OR THREE GREAT POWERS SUCH AS

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THE USSR, THE US AND FRANCE, BUT NOT BY THE TWO SUPER POWERS ALONE.

E. ROLE OF US. NAKAMURA SAID THAT ALL ARAB LEADERS WITH WHOM MIKI TALKED BELIEVED THAT THE US WAS THE KEY TO A SETTLEMENT BECAUSE IT WAS THE ONLY COUNTRY THAT COULD FORCE ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW. KING FAISAL TOLD MIKI THAT IF THE US HAS THE WILL, IT CAN FORCE ISRAEL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, BUT THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE TOLD MIKI IN CAIRO THAT QTE IN THE END THE US WON'T PRESSURE ISRAEL UNQTE. ARAB LEADERS ALL URGED JAPAN TO ASK THE US TO PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND ABIDE BY UNSC RES. 242.

F. AID. NAKAMURA SAID THAT \$280 MILLION FIGURE BANDIED

ABOUT IN PRESS IS VAST EXAGGERATION. IN FACT MOST DETAILS OF ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS HAVE NOT YET BEEN DECIDED AND WILL NOT BE UNTIL END OF THIS MONTH OR FEBRUARY. NAKAMURA DID SAY, HOWEVER, THAT SAUDIS ASKED THAT JAPAN EXTEND ASSISTANCE TO YEMEN AND OMAN AND HE WAS TWICE APPROACHED BY YEMENIS DURING HIS TRIP WITH REQUEST HE VISIT YEMEN. MIKI WAS UNABLE TO DO SO, BUT ZENTARO KOSAKA WILL STOP IN YEMEN DURING HIS UPCOMING TRIP TO ARAB COUNTRIES THAT MIKI DID NOT VISIT (MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TUNISIA, LIBYA, SUDAN, YEMEN, AND POSSIBLY JORDAN). SEE ALSO TOKYO'S 16463 FOR EARLIER REPORT RE MIKI'S OFFERS OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

G. EAG. THE SECRETARY'S PILGRIM SPEECH IN LONDON OCCURRED WHILE MIKI WAS IN SAUDI ARABIA. NAKAMURA SAID THAT THE HEAD OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING AGENCY IN JIDDA EXPRESSED THE HOPE TO MIKI

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TOKYO 128

EXDIS

THAT JAPAN WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN A CONSUMER CONSORTIUM. MIKI REPLIED THAT IT WAS JAPAN'S BASIC BELIEF THAT THE OIL PROBLEM SHOULD BE SOLVED ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION BETWEEN CONSUMERS AND PRODUCERS, BUT HE DID NOT MENTION THE EAG PROPOSAL SPECIFICALLY.

H. EVALUATION OF MIKI MISSION AND FUTURE COURSE. NAKAMURA SAID THAT THE FRIENDLY RECEPTION ACCORDED MIKI AND THE FACT THAT OAPEC HAD SPARED JAPAN FURTHER OIL CUTS HAD PRODUCED GENERAL FEELING THAT THE MIKI MISSION WAS A QTE BIG PLUS UNQTE FOR JAPAN AND HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE MIDEAST SITUATION IN GENERAL. THERE WAS NOW A CONSENSUS WITHIN GOVT, NAKAMURA SIAD, THAT THE GOJ SHOULD DO ALL IT CAN TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE REALIZATION OF A PEACE THAT THE ARABS CAN ACCEPT. THE US HAS THE GREATEST POWER TO BRING ABOUT SUCH A SETTLEMENT, SO MIKI'S MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES IS INTENDED TO ASSIST THIS SEARCH FOR PEACE, AT THE SAME TIME THAT IT RESPONDS TO THE ARAB DESIRE THAT JAPAN COMMUNICATE TO THE US ITS ST\*ONG DESIRE FOR A SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION JAN 7 WITH KUNIO KATAKURA, DEP HEAD  
FONOFF INTL RESOURCES DIV, EMBOFF WAS TOLD:

A. IN ALL OF THE CAPITALS, MIKI DISCUSSED THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES  
BEING FACED IN JAPAN BECAUSE OF SHORTAGE OF OIL, AND CRIPPLING  
EFFECT SHORTAGE WAS HAVING. HE NOTED SPECIFIC EFFECTS ON VARIOUS  
INDUSTRIES, AND ADDED THAT INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION CUTBACKS IN  
JAPAN WERE ALREADY HAVING SERIOUS EFFECTS ON EXPORTS TO SOUTHEAST  
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ASIAN COUNTRIES.

B. MIKI WAS STRONGLY ATTACKED BY KUWAITI PETROLEUM MINISTER  
ARIAI WHO CONDEMNED JAPAN'S INACTIVITY VIS-A-VIS MIDDLE EAST  
PROBLEMS. MIKI FURTHER SAID THAT WITH REGARD TO RELATIONS  
WITH THIRD WORLD, JAPAN PURSUED A COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT FOREIGN  
POLICY, THOUGH IT MIGHT OCCASIONALLY CONSULT WITH ITS FRIENDS.

C. KATAKURA SAID HE PERSONALLY SURPRISED THAT THE  
MOST RADICAL ARAB STATES, IRAQ AND SYRIA, HAD INDICATED THAT THEY  
COULD BE REALISTIC IN SEEKING SOLUTION TO MIDEAST PROBLEMS.  
FOR EXAMPLE KATAKURA SAID SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD HAD REFEREED TO  
POSSIBILITY OF PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM GOLAN HEIGHTS OR  
IMPLEMENTATION OF SOME SORT OF DISENGAGEMENT PLAN SUCH AS DMZ.

D. EVERYONE ON TRIP LEFT WITH ONE PRINCIPAL IMPRESSION,  
ACCORDING TO KATAKURA. THAT WAS CLEAR EXPECTATION BY ARABS THAT  
JAPAN AND EC, PARTICULARLY BRITAIN AND FRANCE, WOULD DO THEIR  
UTMOST TO CONVINCE U.S. TO QTE BE MORE PERSUASIVE UNQTE IN URGING  
ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

E. QUESTION OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PLAYED SECONDARY ROLE  
THROUGHOUT TRIP. HOWEVER, IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA WERE MOST  
EMPHATIC IN LINKING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS WITH STABLE OIL SUPPLY.

3. PUBLIC REACTION TO MIKI TRIP. IN DISPLAY OF UNANIMITY  
WHICH REFLECTED DEEP SENSE OF CRISIS OVER MIDEAST OIL SITUATION,  
MEDIA GAVE MIKI TRIP UNIFORMLY FAVORABLE TREATMENT. EDITORIAL  
COMMENT BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FROM TOKYO REFLECTED SOME  
SKEPTICISM REGARDING EXTENT TO WHICH MIKI'S EFFORTS WOULD RESULT  
IN INCREASED OIL SUPPLIES FOR JAPAN, BUT ALL PAPERS GAVE TRIP  
SOLID BACKING AS NECESSARY AND LONG OVERDUE EFFORT TO VITALIZE  
JAPAN'S MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY. MIKI'S PROGRESS DURING ENTIRE  
18-DAY ITINERARY RECEIVED FULL COVERAGE IN ALL MEDIA AND HIS  
OFFERS OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION TO ARAB NATIONS  
WERE EDITORIALY SUPPORTED AS STEPS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.  
OAPEC DECISION TO TREAT JAPAN AS FRIENDLY NATION ENABLED MIKI TO  
RETURN CLAIMING CREDIT FOR SUCCESSFUL MISSION, WHICH CLAIM  
UNGRUDGINGLY ENDORSED BY PRESS. GENERAL THEME OF EDITORIALS AND  
MEDIA COMMENTARY WAS THAT 1) MIKI MISSION PROVED IMPORTANCE  
DEMONSTRATING JAPAN'S QTE SINCERITY AND UNDERSTANDING UNQTE  
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TOWARDS DEVELOPING NATIONS, 2) JAPAN MUST NOT VAIL TO FULFILL  
PROMISES OF AID AND COOPERATION MADE BY MIKI TO ARAB NATIONS,  
AND 3) JAPAN MUST PLAY MORE POSITIVE ROLE IN ACHIEVING MIDDLE EAST  
PEACE. MIKI'S UPCOMING VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IS SEEN BY  
MEDIA AS LOGICAL FOLLOW-UP TO HIS TRIP WITH MAIN OBJECTIVE  
BEING TO EXPLAIN GOJ POSITION AND TO COORDINATE JAPAN AND US VIEWS ON  
MIDDLE EAST. SHOESMITH

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